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In this paper, we study the association between commercial paper rating 
downgrades and expectations of the level and variability of future earn- 
ings. Our examination shows that such rating downgrades are associated 
with a signiJicant reduction in analyst forecasts of near-term earnings. We 
document a tendency by financial analysts at the Value Line Investment 
Survey to progressively revise their estimates of quarterly earnings down- 
ward on average and implement two methods to control for the resulting 
bias. The reduction in earnings estimates is robust to these controls. In 
addition, we observe an increase in systematic risk for  a subset of jirms 
for which the downgrade implies exit from the commercial paper market. 
Analysis of stock price changes around the downgrade announcement 
dates shows that although the information on lower future earnings re- 
flected in mild rating downgrades merely conjirms market beliefs, the in- 
formation on lower level andor higher variabiliry of future earnings 
associated with severe downgrades constitutes new information unavail- 
able to the market prior to the rating change announcement. 
1. Introduction 
There has been some controversy in the finance literature on the role of rating 
agencies in disseminating financial information to capital markets. Wakeman 
(1984) asserts that credit ratings reflect public assessment of bond risk with a lag 
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and do not convey new information to the market.’ An alternative view is that 
rating agencies possess private information or superior processing ability with re- 
gard to public information so that their initial ratings and rating changes convey 
new information to the market.2 
Consistent with the latter view, stock price reactions to rating changes for long- 
term instruments have been documented by Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro 
(1989); Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992); Holthausen and Leftwich (1986); 
and Stickel (1986). More recently, Nayar and Rozeff (1994) investigated c o m e r -  
cia1 paper (CP hereafter) issuances and rating changes and found that highly rated 
issuances are associated with positive stock price reactions. For rating changes, 
they report that downgrades produce negative stock returns, whereas upgrades have 
no effect. 
Although evidence from prior research indicates that debt rating downgrades 
affect security prices, the nature of the information contained in the downgrades is 
unclear. If the rating downgrade conveys new information on the level of future 
earnings, this should also be reflected in a downward revision in earnings forecasts 
by security analysts. Additionally, if the rating change reflects information on in- 
creased variability of future earnings or cash flows, this should be incorporated 
into security prices as an increase in systematic risk. 
Although these effects are applicable to rating changes on both long-term and 
short-term debt, there are two advantages to examining the latter. First, since short- 
term debt matures at more frequent intervals, ratings on short-term debt are likely 
to be more closely scrutinized: Consequently, short-term debt rating changes may 
occur in a more timely fashion relative to those for longer-term securities, thereby 
providing a signal to investors of operational/business problems afflicting the down- 
graded firm. Second, since the interest rate charged on short-term debt is reset at 
each rollover of the maturing debt, the rating downgrade is likely to translate into 
higher borrowing costs faster for CP than for long-term debt. This is because for 
long-term debt, the firm has already locked in the interest rate at the time of initial 
issuance. Therefore, the impact of the CP rating change on interest costs may be 
reflected more quickly in earnings estimates relative to the effect of rating changes 
on long-teim debt. 
We document a significant reduction in earnings expectations around the 
downgrade announcement for both severely and mildly downgraded firms.3 This 
result is robust to adjustments made to account for the tendency of analysts to be 
1.  The function of a rating agency in Wakeman’s framework is to “attest to the relative quality 
of the bond issue and to the accuracy of the accompanying information ahout the issuing company; 
and.  . . further monitor that bond’s risk over the life of the bond.” This avoids duplication of investor 
effort in assessing bond risk initially and in monitoring it continuously over time, thereby boosting the 
issue price of the bond. 
2. Refer to Holthausen and Leftwich (1986) for evidence that a majority of industrial firms 
whose debt is rated by Standard and Poor’s provide the agency with data that is not in the public 
domain such as detailed segntent information and projccted long-term financial statements. 
3. Severe (mild) rating downgrades are those that (do not) imply exit of the firm from the 
commercial paper market. These terms arc explained further in Section 3 of the paper. 
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overoptimistic in their earlier earnings forecasts and to subsequently revise these 
downward over time. With regard to risk, our results indicate an increase in sys- 
tematic risk (beta) for the subset of firms that were severely downgraded. Further, 
our results show that although the reduction in earnings expectations associated 
with mild downgrades is anticipated by the market prior to the rating change an- 
nouncement, the increase in beta andor lower expectations of future earnings as- 
sociated with severe downgrades convey valuation-relevant information previously 
unavailable to the market. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes relevant 
characteristics of the CP market and discusses the hypotheses. In Section 3, the 
data sources are described. Section 4 reports the empirical methods employed and 
presents the results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. The Commercial Paper Market and Implications of 
Downgrades 
Commercial paper is unsecured debt with a maturity of 270 days or less.4 Most 
CP is sold in large denominations either directly or through dealers. CP represents 
a lower cost alternative to bank loans for borrowing firms, with interest rates close 
to the risk-free rate.5 Generally, CP is rolled over on maturity or refinanced using 
longer-term debt by both financial and nonfinancial firms. Manufacturing firms 
sometimes use CP to finance their capital expenditures. Accounting rules permit 
such firms that roll over their CP continuously to carry CP on their balance sheets 
as long-term debt. Typically, CP is issued so as to be exempt from Securities and 
Exchange Commission registration requirements.6 
The commercial paper market has grown in importance as a source of corporate 
short-term funds over the past 30 years. Abken (1981) reports that the number of 
firms issuing CP rose from over 300 in 1965 to about 1,oOO in 1981. CP issuers 
rated by Moody’s increased from under 800 in 1981 to approximately 1,900 in 
1994 pons and Bergqwist [ 19941). Rose (1985) estimates that the volume of CP 
outstanding grew from $124.4 billion in 1980 to $245.3 billion in 1985. More 
recently, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York reported that CP outstanding in 
December 1991 amounted to $528 billion, which implies a more than doubling of 
CP volume over a period of six years.’ 
The major purchasers of CP are money market mutual funds, corporations, 
insurance companies and banks, and state and local governments. In general, in- 
vestors view CP holdings as secure investments with minimal default risk. Al- 
though CP is unsecured, CP investors achieve effective priority over purchasers of 
4. Refer to Post (1992) for development and other details of the CP market. 
5. Schnure (1994) reports an average three-month CP yield spread of 67 basis points over trea- 
6. See Nayar and Rozeff (1994) for details on the exemption. 
7. Growth in dollar volume of CP leveled off during the period 1991-93 (Fons and Bergqwist 
sury bills over the period 1975-1993. 
~9941).  
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secured obligations due to the very short term maturity of their claim, that is, CP 
holders expect to be paid before the firm goes bankrupt. However, for this de fact0 
priority to hold, investors must buy the highest rated CP. Also, SEC regulations 
mandate that money market mutual funds (the largest buyers of CP) can hold only 
the top rated CP.’ As a result, only firms with the highest credit quality are able 
to issue CP. As with longer-term debt, issuers of CP frequently seek quality ratings 
for these obligations from rating agencies such as Standard and Poor’s Corporation, 
Moody’s Investors’ Service, Duff and Phelps Rating Service, and Fitch Rating 
Services. Some rating agencies will rate CP programs even if they are not hired 
by the issuer to do  SO.^ The CP ratings fall into several categories. Higher ratings 
are Al+ ,  A1 (Standard & Poor’s), or Prime 1 (Pl) (Moody’s), whereas lower 
ratings are A2 and Prime 2 (P2). Issuers rated even lower, A3, Prime 3 (P3), or 
Not prime, generally find that they cannot issue CP, and most outstanding CP lies 
in the top categories.’O 
Although there is a strong association between long-term and short-term credit 
ratings, long-term creditworthiness does not fully measure access to the CP market. 
In other words, it is possible for firms to have the same long-term bond ratings 
but different CP ratings. In assessing the quality of CP, rating agencies consider 
the ability of a company to deal with unexpected financing needs, such as the 
inability to roll over maturing CP. This is critical as due to the short, fixed maturity 
profile of CP, most companies would be unable to repay maturing CP at short 
notice from internally generated cash. Calomiris et al. (1995) show that holding 
bond ratings constant, access to the CP market is enhanced by large firm size, high 
collateral, high earnings, low earnings variance, and large stocks of liquid assets. 
CP rating downgrades are observed to cause “orderly exit” from the CP mar- 
ket (Fons and Kimball [ 19921). Specifically, the market for an issuer’s CP dries up 
after a rating downgrade, which leads to a reduction in the amount of CP outstand- 
ing.” If the default risk becomes considerable, the firm is unable to sell its CP by 
8. The relevant SEC regulation (Rule 2A-7) was implemented in 1991, which occurs during the 
sample period for this study. Refer to Schnure (1994) for reasons other than Rule 2A-7 for the reluctance 
of money market mutual funds to hold lower rated CP and the view that this regulation merely codified 
informal standards that had previously guided their CP purchases. 
9. Refer to Cantor and Packer (1995) for details. 
10. Stigum (1983, p. 637) states that CP “rated A3 and F’3 is salable only to very few investors.” 
Abken (1981) reports that for mid-1980. 75 percent of outstanding CP was in grade 1, 24 percent in 
grade 2, and only 1 percent in grade 3 and below. More recently, Fons and Bergqwist (1994) note that 
of all the CP outstanding that was rated by Moody’s on September 30, 1993, 86 percent was Prime-1, 
13 percent was Prime-2, 0.8 percent was Prime-3, and 0.04 percent was rated Not Prime. This data 
shows that markets for CP rated Prime-3 or worse are narrow or nonexistent. 
11. Fons and Bergqwist (1994) report that for 430 CP rating downgrades that occurred between 
1972 and 1989, CP outstandings declined by 28 percent when the downgrade was to F’2 and by 63 
percent (83%) when the downgrade was to P3 (NP) over a half-year period surrounding the downgrade 
announcement. Resumably, the volume in the lowest category would disappear if the amount outstand- 
ing was followed further out in time. Furthermore, Crabbe and Post (1994) find that downgrades of 
bank holding company CP ratings lead to significant reductions in the amounts of CP outstanding. 
Moreover, the volume of CP outstanding in the third grade and below has historically hovered in the 
1 percent range (see previous footnote). Thus, a downgrade to the third category or lower implies a 
forced exit from the CP market. 
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offering a higher interest rate. It is instead forced to withdraw from the CP market 
and to retire its CP through funds generated via other, more expensive financing 
or asset sales. This “orderly exit” tends to occur prior to any default on the firm’s 
long-term debt and keeps the default rate of CP (less than 0.05 percent on average) 
considerably below that for long-term debt. 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that investors view their CP holdings 
as “near-cash” and tend to buy CP only of firms with high, stable earnings. Rating 
agencies stake their reputations on their ratings since a prime rating implies that a 
firm’s CP will be paid on time even if it is subsequently downgraded (Fons and 
Bergqwist [1994]). We hypothesize that a perceived decrease in level of earnings 
and/or increase in its riskiness will prompt rating agencies to downgrade a firm’s 
CP. If the information conveyed by rating downgrades signals reduced levels of 
earnings, then we expect that financial analysts will lower their earnings estimates 
for downgraded firms. Also, if rating changes contain information about the risk- 
iness of future cash flows, this should be reflected in a change in systematic risk 
(beta) of downgraded firms.” Consequently, to study the information content of 
CP downgrades, we examine changes in analysts’ forecasts of contemporaneous 
and future earnings, and systematic risk. 
Several prior studies have examined firm-specific earnings forecast revisions 
and risk changes subsequent to other major corporate events. For example, Hertzel 
and Jain (199 1) develop an analytical model that decomposes security price changes 
into changes in levels and riskiness of future earnings, and proceed to test it for 
stock repurchase tender offer  announcement^.'^ They find that short-term earnings 
forecasts are revised upward (consistent with the positive stock price reaction that 
accompanies stock repurchase announcements), and equity betas decline. Ofer and 
Siege1 (1987) investigated analyst responses to dividend changes and found that 
earnings forecasts are revised upward, consistent with an information signaling role 
for dividends. Bartov (1991) examined the market reaction to open market share 
repurchase announcements, and found that they are associated with upward revi- 
sions in analyst earnings forecasts and declines in equity betas for the repurchasing 
firms. More recently, Shastri and Shastri (1995) examined earnings forecast revi- 
sions and risk changes associated with announcements of calls of convertible pre- 
ferred stocks. They do not find any significant revisions in earnings forecasts, even 
though such announcements are associated with a negative stock price reaction. 
Given their evidence, Shastri and Shastri (1995) conclude that announcements of 
calls of convertible preferred stock do not convey information about future cash 
flows. In a similar vein, we attempt to determine whether CP rating downgrades 
convey information about future cash flows of the affected firms by examining 
changes in earnings expectations and equity betas. 
12. Refer to Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (1970) for evidence of a positive association between 
13. Our use of beta as a proxy for the variability of future earnings is consistent with Hertzel 
beta and earnings variability. 
and Jain (1991). 
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3. Data 
The data on CP rating downgrades used in this study was obtained from weekly 
issues of Moody’s Bond Survey (MBS) beginning in 1977 and ending in December 
1994. The sample is limited to CP rating changes that are unaccompanied by rating 
changes of any other security like bonds, preferred stock, and the like. We excluded 
the latter observations because inclusion of firms that experience concurrent rating 
changes on other securities may contaminate our results, given our exclusive focus 
on CP.I4 
In the CP market, CP rated P1 or P2 is highly marketable, whereas CP rated 
P3 or Not Prime is not. In this respect, the rating downgrade from P2 to P3 effec- 
tively becomes a proxy for termination of a CP program or a substantial reduction 
in its volume. Our rating change sample contains 56 downgrades from P1 to P2 
and 41 downgrades from P2 to P3 or lower (Not Prime) for a total of 97 CP 
downgrade events. Consistent with Nayar and Rozeff, we define a variable, DEG, 
to measure the severity of the downgrade. DEG takes on a unit value when the 
downgrade is from P2 to P3 or worse, and a value of zero for a change from P1 
to P2. We refer to the former as a severe downgrade, whereas the latter is defined 
to be a mild downgrade. Earnings forecast data on dates before and after the rating 
changes were obtained from various issues of the Value Line Investment Survey. 
Common stock returns were obtained from the CRSP database and financial state- 
ment data are from Compustat. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the sample of firms experiencing CP 
 downgrade^.'^ Firms with CP programs tend to be larger and more creditworthy 
than typical firms. For a detailed comparison of firms that do and do not issue CP, 
the reader is referred to Calomiris, Himmelberg, and Wachtel (1995). 
4. Empirical Methods and Results 
4.1 Earnings Forecast Revisions 
For each firm in the sample, earnings forecasts made by analysts at the Value 
Line Investment Survey (VL) on dates immediately before, b, and after, a, the 
rating downgrade were compiled. The time line in Figure 1 shows the various 
points in time relevant in computing earnings forecast revisions. Specifically, 
we collected the forecasts for the two earliest quarters, q l  and q2, for which 
earnings had not been announced on a, the date of the first issue of Value Line 
published after the downgrade that contained the firm’s earnings fore- 
14. A portion of the data used in this study was collected for Nayar and Rozeff (1994). We thank 
15. For Table 1, several firms had missing data. This was because financial data on these firms 
them for providing us with this data. 
were (1) unavailable from Compustat and/or (2) they were utilities or financial firms. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Firms Experiencing a Pure 
Commercial Paper Rating Downgrade 
The sample of pure commercial paper downgrades was obtained from issues of Moody's Bond Survey 
from 1986 to 1994. The statistics here are obtained for the sample firms from the Compustat primary, 
secondary, and tertiary, full coverage, and research files. The numbers are taken from the financial 
statements in the fiscal year immediately preceding the rating downgrade. 
Number of Standard 
Measure Observations Mean Median Minimum Maximum Deviation 
Total assets 77 2109.9 1368.6 161.9 12417.5 2139.6 
Current ratio" 71 1.78 1.75 0.42 3.39 0.56 





Debt ratiob 70 0.225 0.210 0.008 0.641 0.114 
'Current ratio is the ratio of Current assets to current liabilities. 
bDebt ratio is computed as (short-term debt + long-term debt)/total assets. 
casts.I6 Let Fbql be the forecast made on date b (i.e., before the rating change 
occurs) of earnings to be realized at the end of the next fiscal quarter (41). Simi- 
larly, let Fbq2 represent the forecast made on date 6,  prior to the rating downgrade, 
of earnings for the second fiscal quarter (q2). Next, let Fa,, and Foq2 be the forecasts 
made on date a ,  that is, after the rating downgrade has occurred, of the earnings 
to be realized at the first (41) and second (42) fiscal quarter-ends, respectively." 
For example, say that a rating downgrade occurred in October 1982 for a firm 
with a December 31 fiscal year-end. For this firm, say that the earnings forecasts 
appear in the August 23 and November 22, 1982, issues of Value Line. Then Fbq, 
(Fbqz) refers to the forecast that appears in the August 23, 1982, Value Line issue, 
whereas Fa,, (Faq2) refers to the forecast in the November 22, 1982, issue regarding 
earnings for the quarter ending December 31, 1982 (March 31, 1983), if actual 
third-quarter earnings are reported in the November 22 issue of VL." 
16. Vulue Line analyzes the performance of a subset of firms each week, with each firm being 
covered once per quarter. A source at VL informed us that earnings forecasts reported in VL are made 
exactly seven days before the date stamped on the issue, which is the approximate date at which it is 
received by subscribers. Dates u and b were selected after adjusting for this reporting lag. We did not 
examine long-range earnings forecasts as these tend to be fairly stable in the presence of information 
on potential earnings changes. A possible explanation for this phenomenon may be that analysts are 
reluctant to revise their long-range forecasts early due to the possibility that new information may 
render the revision unnecessary (Stickel [1989]). 
17. In the material that follows, these and other variables are computed for every downgrade 
event in the sample. For notational simplicity, we have chosen to omit the event subscript. 
18. If actual third-quarter earnings are not reported in the November 22 issue of VL, then ql and 
q2 refer to the quarters ended September 30 and December 31, 1982, respectively. 
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FIGURE 1 
Time Line to Illustrate the Sequence of Dates for Earnings Forecast 
Revision Tests 
I I 
I I I 
The difference in earnings forecasts made before and after the downgrade was 
scaled by Pb, the predowngrade stock price." Specifically, the following terms were 
computed for each event in our sample: 
In eq. ( l ) ,  a,, and a,, represent revisions in the VL forecasts for quarters ql  and 
q2 around disclosures of the rating downgrades. Under the null hypothesis of no 
systematic change in analyst forecasts around the rating downgrade, the average of 
these forecast changes should be close to zero. Parametric t tests were conducted 
on S, and S,, to see if their means are negative. A nonparametric Wilcoxon signed 
rank test was also used. 
The use of S, and S,, as proxies for changes in market expectations of eamings 
may bias our test results in view of the statistical properties of analysts' forecasts 
documented in prior research. O'Brien (1988) reports a negative bias in mean 
earnings forecast errors for forecasts of annual earnings made by analysts from 
different brokerage houses.2o Francis and Philbrick ( 1993) document an average 
optimism of 9 percent of forecasted earnings ($0.18 per share) in a sample of Value 
Line forecasts of annual and first-quarter earnings. Furthermore, Stickel (1990) 
using data on annual earnings forecasts made by a large cross section of analysts 
shows that, on average, the optimism in an analyst's forecasts reduces with each 
successive forecast. If this successive reduction in optimism extends also to V d u e  
Line forecasts of quarterly earnings, the measures of change in market expectations 
defined in eq. (1) would bias our statistical tests toward rejection of the null hy- 
19. P ,  (fnm Value Line) is the firm's stock price two days before forecast date 6. 
20. Possible reasons for the systematic optindsm in analysts' forecasts lhat have been mentioned 
in prior research are (a) analysts' desire to maintain good relations with management, (b) failure to 
fully incorporate recent negative earnings into their forecasts, and (c) incentives associated with their 
firms' brokerage, underwriting and investnient banking xtivities (see O'Brien [ 19881 and Francis and 
Philbrick [1')93], for example). Our use of Value Liue may mitigate some of these concerns since Value 
Line is not engaged in the brokeragelunderwriting business. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Tests on Measures of Differential Bias in 
Successive Value Line Forecasts of Quarterly Earnings 
425 
Number of 
Measure Observations Mean Median t Statistic Signed Rank 
Q, 91 - 0.002 17 -0.00062 -2.60** -498.0** 
QZ 88 -0.00134 -0.00014 -2.29** -490.0*** 
C,, and C, denote changes in the one- and two-quarter-ahead earnings forecasts estimated in the 
year prior to the event year. They represent the expected reduction in forecasted earnings over a quarter 
due to the tendency of analysts to be more optimistic about earnings over longer forecast horizons. 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test. 
***Significantly different from 0 at the 0.001 level in a one-tailed test. 
pothesis of no reduction in forecasts of future earnings. To filter out this bias from 
our analysis, we define proxies for the expected forecast revision over the period 
between the two VL forecast dates b and a by computing earnings forecast revision 
measures analogous to 6,, and 6,, for each event over correspondmg windows in 
the year prior to the event year.,, These measures, denoted by Cq, and C,,, respec- 
tively, are used as proxies for the expected forecast revisions due to reduction in 
optimistic bias over successive analysts’ forecasts absent the release of any infor- 
mation on the firm’s earnings over the intervening period. In Table 2, we present 
descriptive statistics on C,, and C,, and associated test results. 
In Table 2, over the period corresponding to the event period in the year prior 
to the event year, the mean Value Line forecast revision was -0.22 percent of 
stock price for quarter q l  and -0.13 percent of stock price for the following 
quarter. The parametric t test indicates that the mean forecast revision is statistically 
significant for both quarters. The nonparametric test confirms these results.22 This 
suggests that VL analysts systematically lower their earnings estimates over suc- 
cessive forecasts for the same firm-quurter. This result is consistent with Stickel 
(1990) who reports a significant downward drift in annual earnings forecasts for 
21. With reference to OUT earlier example of an event date in October 1982, we would now 
compute measures of earnings forecast revisions [refer to eq. (l)] using forecasts made in the relevant 
Value Line issues from August and November 1981. We also used data from a year after the event to 
measure the expected reduction in forecast optimism. These results are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained using data from the year prior to the event and are not reported. 
22. We also tested for the presence of this bias using a larger sample of firms, that is, not just 
those with rating changes. Specifically, we extracted the Value Line forecasts for all firms available on 
the Z x k s  detailed earnings estimates tapes in the period from 1984 through 1994. For these Value Line 
estimates, we computed measures analogous to the variables Cql and Cq2 and tested to see if they, in 
general, were different from 0. The results using 38,838 observations for C,, and 18,275 observations 
for Zqz indicate that both the first- and second-quarter-ahead forecast revisions are negative and signif- 
icant, with the latter being smaller in magnitude. These results are qualitatively similar to those for our 
CP downgrade sample. 
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sell-side analysts. Thus, the differential optimism in consecutive analysts’ forecasts 
of quarterly earnings needs to be controlled for when using such forecast revisions 
as proxies for changes in market expectations of future cash flows associated with 
potentially informative events. 
In our study, we introduce such a control by determining an adjusted revision 
in market expectations of earnings for each event, which is computed as S, and 
S,, minus the respective expected forecast revisions represented by Z, and Zq2. 
Specifically, we compute 
One can think of a,, and as2 as the unexpected components of earnings forecast 
revisions scaled by price for ql and q2. The adjustment already described is aimed 
at filtering out the tendency of analysts to be overoptimistic in their early forecasts 
and then to progressively reduce their earnings estimates with the passage of time. 
Our adjustment procedure generates a unique value for the expected forecast re- 
vision around each event and controls for its variation by firm, analyst, financial 
quarter, and forecast horizon in the aggregate.23 
Statistical tests previously conducted on a, and 6,, are also performed on the 
measures computed using eq. (2), that is, after adjustment for the optimistic bias 
in analysts’ forecasts of earnings. The results of the tests on 6 and R appear in 
Table 3. In the first and third rows, for the first fiscal quarter-end subsequent to 
the rating downgrade, both measures of earnings forecast revisions (i.e., unadjusted, 
represented by 6,,, and adjusted for changes in analysts’ optimistic bias, represented 
by a,,) are negative on average and significant for the full sample (panel A). This 
finding is robust to whether the parametric or the nonparametric test is employed. 
The results in the second and fourth rows of panel A indicate that the revision in 
earnings forecasts for the second fiscal quarter-end after the rating downgrade, both 
unadjusted and adjusted for differences in analyst forecast bias, is also negative 
and significant. However, this effect is not as strong as its counterpart for the first 
fiscal quarter-end. Thus, on average, there is a significant downward revision in 
earnings forecasts for both the first and second fiscal quarter-ends subsequent to 
the rating downgrades. 
To assess the pervasiveness of the association between CP rating downgrades 
and earnings forecast revisions, we partition our sample events on the seventy of 
the downgrade and recompute the four measures of earnings forecast revision 
shown in panel A of Table 3 for these subsamples. The results are presented in 
panel B (C) of Table 3 for the severe (mild) downgrade subsamples. The downward 
revision in analyst earnings forecasts for the overall sample does not appear to be 
23. Ideally, we would have liked to arrive at our firm-specific estimates of expected reduction in 
analyst optimism by aggregating forecast data over several years, thereby reducing noise. However, 
since our data was manually collected from issues of Value Line. Zq, and Zq2 are obtained in this study 
using only one previous value of forecast revision for each event. Later in this section, we describe 
and present results for an alternative method that compares the earnings forecast revisions for the 
treatment firms against those of control firms. 
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TABLE 3 
Earnings Forecast Revisions for Firms around Commercial Paper Rating 
Downgrades-Raw and Adjusted for Analyst Forecast Bias 
The sample of firms with a commercial paper downgrade was obtained from Moody’s Bond Survey 
from 1986 to 1994. Earnings forecasts were obtained from the Value Line Invesfment Survey. The 
subscripts ql and q2 in the variables refer to the one and two fiscal quarter ends subsequent to the 
commercial paper rating change announcement; 6 represents the earnings forecast revision over the 
rating change period deflated by the predowngrade stock price; and C (a) denotes the standardized 
forecast revision 6 adjusted for analyst forecast bias by using one-year-before (matched firm) forecast 
revisions. 
Forecast Number 
Revision of Signed 
Measure Observations Mean Median t Statistic Rank 
Panel A: Full sample 
641 91 -0.00995 -0.00333 -4.07*** -931.5*** 
gq2 88 -0.00404 -0.00277 -3.82*** -687.5*** 
a41 91 -0.00778 -0.00280 -3.24*** -740.0*** 
a,* 88 -0.00270 - 0.00 155 -2.16* - 487.5 * * 
$4 1 90 -0.00790 -0.001 96 -2.97** -772.5*** 
4Jq2 85 -0.00134 - 0.0001 2 -1.14 -185.5 
Pariel B: Severe downgrade subsample 
64 I 37 - 0.0 I 30 1 - 0.0047 1 -3.75** - 152.0*** 
%2 35 -0.00425 -0.00071 - 2.02* -75.0* 
0 4 1  37 - 0.01 003 -0.00308 -2.17* - 115.0* 
% L 36 -0.01 099 -0.00216 -2.41* - 198.5*** 
J142 32 -0.Ooox1 -0.0oO09 -0.45 -14.5 
n4z 35 -0.00262 -0.00133 - 1.20 -42.5 
Panel C: Mild downgrade subsample 
6, I 54 -0.00785 -0.00293 -3.08** -317.5*** 
s42 53 - 0.00390 -0.00313 -3.57*** -321.0*** 
a41 54 -0.00624 - 0.00230 -2.46** -271.5** 
Q4z 53 -0,00275 -0.00176 - 1.83* -230.5** 
$4 I 54 -0.00583 -0.00078 -1.80* -171.0 
k Z 2  53 -0.001 50 - 0.000 12 - 1.09 -95.0 
*Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test. 
***Significantly different from 0 at the 0.001 level in a one-tailed test. 
driven by observations in either the severe or mild downgrade subsample. We also 
conducted parametric and nonparametric tests on 6 and R to determine any differ- 
ences of location in earnings forecast revisions between the two subsamples. These 
tests did not reveal a significant difference in the magnitude of forecast revisions 
between the two subsamples. In other words, both mild and severe downgrades of 
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CP ratings are associated with downward revisions in market expectations of short- 
term ea1-nings.2~ 
The use of s1 as the measurement variable for earnings forecast revision is 
based on the assumption that the analyst bias is stationary, that is, the bias around 
the event date is the same as that in the prior year. As a robustness check, we also 
used an alternate measure to adjust for analysts’ optimistic bias. In this alternative 
method, for each sample firm, we identify a control firm (followed by Value Line) 
in the same industry and closest in size to our sample firm as measured by net 
sales prior to the downgrade anno~ncement.~~ Since earnings forecasts for all firms 
in the same industry are made by Value Line in a single issue, the forecast dates 
for each sample firm and its matched control firm are identical. For these control 
firms, we compute variables analogous to 6,, and a,, which we define to be 6,,., 
and 6q2,m. We then compute the unexpected revision in earnings forecast for the 
sample firm (i.e., after adjusting for the control firm’s earnings forecast revision) 
as 
where the subscript m denotes the matched firm. Apart from filtering out analyst 
bias, this method also controls for industry-specific and economywide information 
(implicit in the control firm’s forecast revisions) entering the market during the 
forecast revision period. However, if the downgrade of a firm’s CP causes analysts 
to lower the earnings expectations for other firms in the same industry, that is, if 
intraindustry information transfers are occurring, this method would bias our test 
results against rejection of the null hypothesis by screening out a portion of the 
treatment effect.26 
After the computation of \lrql and $q2, parametric and nonparametric statistical 
tests (as used for 6’s )  were conducted. The results are also shown in Table 3 as 
additional rows in each of panels A, B, and C. These results confirm the results 
described earlier for the one-quarter-ahead earnings forecast revisions. They are 
significantly negative for the full sample as well as for both the severe and mild 
24. We also conducted multiple regressions using various measures of earnings forecast revision 
as the dependent variable and the variables DEG (an indicator variable that equals 0 [ 11 for mild [severe] 
downgrades), the three-day abnormal return over days [-2.01 relative to the CP downgrade announce- 
ment date, the multiday abnormal return over [b, (11 not including [-2.01, and the amount of long-term 
debt as a fraction of total assets as of the last fiscal yearend before the downgrade as independent 
variables. None of the regression coefficients were significant. 
25. A benefit of this matching mechanism is that we avoid the problem of matching on SIC 
codes noticed by Kahle and Walkling (1996). Additionally, refer to Ramnath (1996) for evidence that 
grouping firms based on analyst following rather than by four-digit SIC codes results in a more ho- 
mogeneous set of firms. 
26. Refer to Foster (1981) for evidence that surprises associated with earnings releases of a firm 
are related to contemporaneous security price changes for other firms in the same industry and to 
Baginski (1987) for evidence that announcements of management forecasts of firm-specific earnings 
are associated with security price changes of other industry members. An examination of whether or 
not CP rating downgrades are associated with such intraindustry information transfers is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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downgrade subsamples. The second-quarter-ahead forecast revisions are also neg- 
ative, albeit insignificant. As before, we also conducted difference of location tests 
between the two subsamples according to severity of the downgrade. The results 
of these tests did not indicate any statistical difference in the earnings forecast 
revisions between the severe and mild downgrade subsamples. 
The downward revisions in earnings forecasts documented in Table 3 can be 
viewed as arising from two possible sources.27 First, this may primarily reflect 
expectations of an increase in the future interest expense of the firm due to the CP 
downgrade. Second, the market may additionally interpret the rating downgrade as 
a signal of lower operating performance for the firm beyond the likely increase in 
interest expense induced by the downgrade. To provide some insight into this issue, 
we examined sales forecast revisions by Value Line analysts across the CP down- 
grade date. We selected sales as our variable of interest as (1) interest expense is 
not directly related to sales revenues and (2) it is the only other income statement 
item, apart from earnings, for which Value Line issues quarterly forecasts. We find 
that the percentage revision in sales forecasts is negative on average and significant 
for the first fiscal quarter-end subsequent to the downgrade. For the second fiscal 
quarter-end, the revision is negative but only marginally significant.28 These results 
suggest that the information conveyed by CP rating downgrades is associated with 
lower future sales prospects. Furthermore, they support the hypothesis that the 
downward revision in earnings forecasts associated with rating downgrades reflects 
expectations of lower operating performance beyond increased borrowing costs 
induced by the downgrade. 
4.2 Risk Shifts 
To test for shifts in beta around CP rating downgrade announcements, stock 
returns for each firm and the CRSP equally weighted market index are collected 
over two separate time ‘windows. The first window (designated “preevent”) con- 
sists of a 250 trading day period ending on day -51 in event-time (where day 0 
is the day of the announcement of the downgrade). The second window (“postev- 
ent”) is also 250 trading days in length but begins on day +51 in event time. The 
following system of equations is estimated over the entire 500 trading day period 
in event time: 
27. We thank the referee for suggesting these possibilities for investigation. 
28. For the first fiscal quarter end, the mean revision in sales forecasts over 91 sample downgrades 
was -2.4 percent with a t statistic of -2.02 (significant at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test) and a 
Wilcoxon signed rank statistic that was significant at the 0.01 level. The test relating to the second 
fiscal quarter-end was conducted over 88 observations and produced a mean revision in sales forecasts 
of -1.7 percent, with a t statistic of -1.46 (insignificant) and a Wilcoxon signed rank test statistic 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
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where f = -300, -299,. . . , -51, +51, +52,. . . , +300, (a day index) and i = 
1, 2, .  . . , N (an event index). In eq. (4), R,, is the return on day r for security i; 
R,, is the equally weighted market return on day t; Di, is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 in the postevent period and is 0 before it; and a,, b,, and h, are event- 
specific regression coefficients. The coefficient h, represents the change in beta 
after the rating downgrade. The joint estimation and hypothesis testing provides us 
with a powerful test for examining whether beta has changed, on average, after the 
CP rating downgrade across all firms in the sample. If rating downgrades are as- 
sociated with a perception of higher risk for the affected firms' securities, h, should 
be positive on average. 
The results of the estimation for the downgraded firms are presented in panel 
A of Table 4. These results indicate that for the overall sample (sufficient security 
return data was available on CRSP for 83 downgrade events), beta increased by 
0.055 from an average of 0.94. This increase is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. Thus, for the overall sample, an increase in risk is detected. Following this 
test on the overall sample, separate tests are then conducted on the two subsamples 
formed on severity of the downgrade. For the severe downgrade sample, the mean 
beta change is 0.1 10, which is significantly positive at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed 
test. On the other hand, for the mild downgrade sample, the mean h, is insignificant. 
This implies that only firms with a severe CP downgrade experience a significant 
increase in their systematic risk.29 
One reason for the documented beta shift may be a general increase in riskiness 
of the industry group to which the sample firm belongs.30 To examine this hy- 
pothesis further, we perform tests for beta change on the set of matched firms that 
was earlier used as a control for earnings forecast ~evisions.~' The results for the 
control firm sample are presented in panel B of Table 4. These results indicate that 
the control firms do not experience any increase in (beta) risk, both when consid- 
ered as a single sample and when partitioned on severity of the rating downgrade 
for the matching sample firms. Thus, the beta shift documented for severely down- 
graded firms does not appear to be due to an increase in overall risk of the industry 
group to which the sample firm belongs. 
Two reasons may explain why the increase in equity beta is confined only to 
the severely downgraded firms. These are not mutually exclusive, and both are 
related to the orderly exit phenomenon associated with severe CP downgrades. 
29. Denis and Kadlec (1994) show that studies that examine changes in beta may report erroneous 
results if they do not control for trading activity. We conducted tests on the difference in the volume 
of trade in the preevent and postevent periods used to estimate beta shifts. Both parametric and non- 
parametric tests showed that volume of trading was unchanged before and after the downgrade. Thus, 
a difference in trading activity does not appear to be the likely explanation for the beta shift, The size 
statistics in Table 1 indicate that OUT sample firms are large. Moreover, CP issuing firms are well- 
known firms. Consequently, the additional problem of infrequent trading suggested by Denis and Kadlec 
(1994) is unlikely to apply here. 
30. We thank the referee for this alternative explanation and for suggesting the associated test. 
31. The number of observations for the control firm sample is lower than that for the sample 
fim due to missing security return data on CRSP. 
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TABLE 4 
Beta Shifts Associated with Commercial Paper Rating Downgrades 
Sample 
Number of Mean Beta 
Observations Shift (h) t Statistic 
Panel A: Sample lirms 
Full sample 83 
Severe downgrade subsample 31 




Pane[ B: Control firms 
Full sample 16 0.003 0.09 
Severe downgrade subsample 29 0.059 0.93 
Mild downgrade subsample 47 -0.031 -0.73 
*Significantly greater than 0 at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. 
h is the average change in beta estimated using daily stock returns over the periods [-300,-51] 
and [+51,+300] relative to announcements of CP rating downgrades. 
First, as previously mentioned, CP buyers have a low tolerance for risk and view 
their investment as being close to cash in terms of security. If rating agencies 
perceive a significant increase in risk for a CP issuer, they may issue only severe 
rating downgrades signaling that the firm no longer meets the CP market’s stringent 
criteria for credit quality and leading to its withdrawal from the CP market. Given 
this negative signal, the systematic risk of the affected firm is elevated in the equity 
markets. Second, if a firm depends on short-term funds to finance its working 
capital requirements, these requirements become greater when it faces operating 
problems. If the firm is driven out of the CP market due to a severe downgrade of 
its CP rating, it is deprived of this source of funds when its need is greatest. In 
this situation, it may replace its CP borrowings with funds from more expensive 
and uncertain sources leading to the increased beta that we document. 
4.3 Event Study of Commercial Paper Downgrade Announcements 
Our results thus far indicate that CP rating downgrades are associated with a 
downward revision in short-term earnings expectations for both mild and severe 
downgrades and an increase in systematic risk for the severe downgrades. We next 
examine whether these revisions in market expectations occur before the CP rating 
downgrades or alternatively whether they represent new information conveyed to 
the market by the rating change announcement. 
For each firm in the sample, the Wall Street Journal lndex was examined to 
see if the downgrade announcement was contaminated by other news announce- 
ments over the interval spanning days [-2,0], where day 0 is the announcement 
date of the CP downgrade. Of the original sample of 97 firms, 57 were found to 
have informationally clean announcement dates and sufficient security return data 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA LIBRARIES on January 20, 2016jaf.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
432 JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING, AUDITING & FINANCE 
TABLE 5 
Abnormal Returns Associated with Pure Commercial Paper Downgrades 
The results here are for the sample of 57 lirrns, which are drawn from the original 97 firms with CP 
downgrades. These 57 firms have no confounding news announcements in the period spanning days 
[-2,0] relative to the announcement of the CP downgrade. 
Positive to Negative 
Event Window Mean Median 2 Statistic Abnormal Returns 
Panel A: Full sample 
[ -50,- 31 -0.19% 
[-2.01 -1.01% 
[+ 1 ,+21 -0.26% 
Panel B: Severe downgrade subsample 
[ -50,- 31 0.72% 
[ - 2.01 -1.88% 
r+1,+21 -0.04% 
Panel C: Mild downgrade subsample 
[ -50, - 31 -1.03% 
[+1,+21 -0.47% 




























*Significantly different from 0 at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed test. 
**Significantly different from 0 at the 0.01 level in a one-tailed test. 
***Significantly different from 0 at the 0.001 level in a one-tailed test. 
"Ratio of positive to negative abnormal returns is smaller in the specified interval than in the 
preevent estimation period consisting of 250 days ending on day -51 in event time at the 0.01 level 
in a one-tailed generalized sign test. 
bRatio of positive to negative abnormal returns is smaller in the specified interval than in the 
preevent estimation period consisting of 250 days ending on day - 5 1  in event time at the 0.001 level 
in a one-tailed generalized sign test. 
available on CRSP for the analysis that follows. An event study was performed 
based on standardized abnormal returns (see Mikkelson and Partch [ 1986]), using 
the CRSP value weighted index return as proxy for the market return and an es- 
timation period of 250 days ending on day -51 in event time. The results for the 
full sample (in panel A of Table 5 )  show that announcements of CP downgrades 
are associated with a mean price change of -1.01 percent, which is significantly 
negative at the 0.05 level. This result is consistent with the negative announcement 
effect documented by Nayar and Rozeff (1994). 
The preceding analysis was replicated for subsamples formed on the severity 
of the downgrade. The results are shown in panel B (C) for the severe (mild) 
downgrade subsample. Note that the stock price reaction to mild rating downgrades 
is statistically insignificant, that is, the significant stock price reaction documented 
for the overall sample is driven entirely by the severe downgrade subsample. This 
shows that the information reflected in the significant earnings forecast revisions 
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shown in Table 3 around mild downgrade announcements appears to be anticipated 
by the market prior to the downgrade date, that is, these rating changes merely 
confirm prior information available to the market through alternative sources. On 
the other hand, the increase in beta andor decline in market expectations of earn- 
ings documented for the severely downgraded subsample constitute new informa- 
tion that is relevant for firm valuation, as indicated by the price response to these 
CP rating downgrade  announcement^.^^ 
5. Summary 
Strong ratings are considered by investors to be a prerequisite for participation 
in the commercial paper market. Although prior research has shown that stock 
prices respond to announcements of commercial paper rating changes, the nature 
of the information contained in such rating changes is unclear. This study examines 
whether rating downgrades are associated with changes in expectations of levels 
andor riskiness of earnings. Our results are summarized next. 
First, the downgrade of a firm’s short-term debt rating is associated with a 
significant reduction in the expectation of its near term earnings. Specifically, we 
show that over a three-month period surrounding the rating downgrade, the revision 
in the Value Line earnings forecast for the first following quarter-end is significantly 
negative, whereas the forecast revision for the following quarter-end is also nega- 
tive, albeit weaker in magnitude. These revisions in forecasted earnings occur for 
both severe and mild rating downgrades. We also document a tendency by analysts 
at Value Line to progressively revise their forecasts of quarterly earnings downward 
and implement two methods to control for the resulting bias. The downward re- 
vision in earnings estimates associated with CP downgrades is robust to these two 
controls. Thus, CP downgrades, in general, appear to be associated with decreases 
in expectations of future earnings. 
Second, our examination of risk shifts indicates that firms that suffer a severe 
downgrade experience a statistically significant increase in beta, on average. For 
firms with mild downgrades, there is no evidence of an increase in beta. Changes 
in trading activity, infrequent trading, and increased risk of the industry group of 
the downgraded firms are unlikely candidates to explain the beta shifts observed. 
This result shows that the CP downgrade announcement contains information about 
systematic security risk which is not incorporated in the estimate of predowngrade 
beta. Given the “orderly exit” explanation, this has consequences for the financing 
of‘ additional capital for affected firms. Specifically, severely downgraded firms will 
be forced to exit the CP market following the downgrade. To replace the CP 
borrowings that firms are unable to roll over, they will have to turn to other sources. 
If other debt sources are also unavailable, or more costly, the firm will have to 
32. We also conducted similar tests over an expanded sample, which included events where other 
significant news releases occurred within the CP downgrade event window. The results of this analysis 
are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the clean sample and are not reported. 
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issue equity. Given the increased beta, this would imply a higher cost of new equity 
capital, which could have negative repercussions. 
Third, we examine security prices of firms around their CP downgrade dates. 
We find that (a) CP downgrade announcements are associated with negative stock 
price changes, consistent with Nayar and Rozeff (1994) and (b) this stock price 
reaction appears to be confined to the severe downgrade subsample. This result 
indicates that mild rating downgrades mainly serve to certify information already 
available in the market prior to the downgrade through alternative sources, whereas 
the lower level and/or greater variability in future earnings associated with severe 
downgrades conveys new valuation relevant information to the market. 
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